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ABSTRACT 
Research on theory of mind (ToM) has been dominated by the traditional False Belief 
tasks; however, recent work has established a developmental sequence for children’s mental-
state understanding. Wellman and Liu (2004) formulated a ToM scale that tests four additional 
aspects of ToM abilities in the visual realm: Diverse Desires, Diverse Beliefs, Knowledge 
Access, and Real-Apparent Emotions. Our study extended the scale to include five parallel tasks 
assessing ToM in the auditory realm. Sixty-six typically developing preschoolers (30 female) 
between the ages of 3- and 5-years-old were tested using 10 ToM tasks (5 visual, 5 auditory). A 
3(age) x 2(modality) x 2(gender) repeated measures ANOVA yielded significant effects for age 
and gender, where 4- and 5-year-olds demonstrated greater mental-state understanding than 3-
year-olds and girls passed more tasks than boys. There was no effect of modality nor did any 
interactions emerge. Like the visual tasks in the theory-of-mind scale, the auditory tasks form a 
scalable set, with Diverse Desires and Diverse Beliefs occurring earlier in the scale than 
Knowledge Access, False Belief, and Real-Apparent Emotions. Our new scale provides 
researchers with five novel tasks to measure the progression of theory-of-mind development in 
the auditory realm and may be extended to assess preschoolers, such as children with visual 
impairments and children with autism spectrum disorder, who have shown delays in mental-state 
understanding when tested using predominantly visual tasks. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Understanding the mind is a key developmental achievement that enables children to reason 
about their social world (Wellman, 1990).  In 1978, Premack and Woodruff coined the term 
“theory of mind” to describe how children come to represent and infer others’ mental states.  
Mental states (i.e., desires, emotions, beliefs, and intentions) are inner experiences that are often 
expressed through behavior (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  
Over the past few decades many psychologists have focused on exploring theory-of-mind 
development within the first five years of life (de Villers, 2007; O’Neill, Astington, & Flavell, 
1996; Wellman, 1990).  Their research reveals that children first learn that others have internal 
mental states, and then they subsequently come to understand that others’ internal mental states 
might differ from their own and even from reality. 
Many researchers have used false-belief tasks as the gold standard for determining when 
a child has acquired theory-of-mind skills.  False-belief tasks require that the child understands 
that other people may hold mistaken beliefs that differ from what the child knows to be true 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  From false-belief tasks alone, it appears that theory-of-mind abilities 
emerge around age four (Flavell, 2004; Hala, Hug, & Henderson, 2003).  More and more 
research suggests that the false-belief task may not be an accurate measure of mental-state 
understanding and that children may be aware of people’s inner psychological states even earlier 
in life (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010). Wellman and Liu (2004), along with several others 
(Bloom & German, 2000; Fabricius & Khalil, 2009; McAlister & Peterson, 2013), argue that it is 
misleading to consider theory-of-mind development as a single cognitive process or 
achievement.  Rather, they propose that theory-of-mind abilities form a series of 
accomplishments that develop over time. 
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Wellman and Liu’s (2004) theory-of-mind scale charts the development of mental-state 
understanding in preschoolers.  In their study, they presented children with a series of tasks 
assessing five aspects of theory-of-mind development to test the hypothesis that achievement on 
some tasks might precede achievement on others (e.g., ignorance before false belief; Wellman & 
Liu, 2004).  Their results indicated that theory-of-mind abilities develop in the following 
sequence: Diverse Desires, Diverse Beliefs, Knowledge Access, False Belief, and finally Real-
Apparent Emotions.  The theory-of-mind scale provides researchers with a broader view of 
children’s developing mental-state understanding.  It has since been adopted to examine whether 
the sequence of development holds true for children from different cultures (Nawaz, Hanif, & 
Lewis; 2014; O’Reilly & Peterson, 2014; Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011), 
children who are deaf (Wellman, Fang, & Peterson, 2011), children with cochlear implants 
(Remmel & Peters, 2008), and children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (Peterson, 
Wellman & Liu, 2005; See Discussion). 
As successful as Wellman and Liu’s (2004) theory-of-mind scale is, it is worth noting 
that all five tasks are primarily visual. Children make sense of the world around them based on 
inputs from multiple modalities, not just their visual environment.  Auditory input, in particular, 
provides important information not present to the eyes, and this information can support 
children’s early reasoning and communication skills (Kirk, Diefendorf, Pisoni & Robbins, 1995).  
Yet there have been few studies that have assessed theory-of-mind development outside of visual 
and tactile modalities (Brambring & Asbrock, 2010; Davis, 2001; O’Neill, Astington, & Flavell, 
1996; Peterson, Wellman, & Slaughter, 2012; Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2013; Scott, He, 
Baillargeon, & Cummins, 2012).  Brambring and Asbrock (2010) tested 4-10-year-old 
congenitally blind children from Germany and 3-6-year-old sighted children (control group) 
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from the Netherlands using visual, tactile, and auditory false-belief tasks. They did not find any 
differences in solution frequency among the false-belief tasks based on visual, tactile, or auditory 
experiences. Few other studies have probed how children use auditory information to reason 
about others’ mental states (Moll, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2012; Williamson, Brooks, & 
Meltzoff, 2013).  
The purpose of our study was to extend the theory-of-mind scale into the auditory realm 
and to investigate when and in what sequence preschoolers begin to understand mental states 
presented via sounds.  We addressed these questions by constructing a set of five auditory 
theory-of-mind tasks that paralleled Wellman and Liu’s (2004) visual theory-of-mind scale tasks 
(See Section 2.3). 
1.1 Theory of Mind  
Theory of mind explores children’s developing abilities to reason about mental states and 
predict others’ thoughts, beliefs, and behaviors (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & 
Plaisted, 1999; Frye & Moore, 1991).  Premack and Woodruff first coined the term “theory of 
mind” in 1978. It is discussed in terms of a theory for two reasons: 1) mental states are not 
directly observable, and 2) mental-state understanding is a system of inferences that can be used 
to make predictions (Taylor, 1996).  Although mental states are unobservable, they are 
commonly expressed through terms such as: want, think, know, and believe (Gelman & Au, 
1996; Povinelli & Preuss, 1995). Research on children’s theory-of-mind continues to show that 
the ability to understand mental states is important for typical development of social, affective, 
and communicative relationships (Gweon, Dodell-Feder, Bedny, & Saxe, 2012; Perner, Frith, 
Leslie, and Leekam, 1989).   
Knowledge about the mind is considered to be one of the most fundamental domains of 
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human understanding (Wellman and Gelman, 1992).  Children who develop an understanding of 
beliefs come to know that mental states vary by person and that some mental states can change 
over time (Gelman & Au, 1996).  Knowing how others think and behave transforms the way 
children “see other people and make sense of what they are doing” (Frye & Moore, 1991, p. 2).  
Leekam (1993) notes that moral, social, and communication development is also closely tied to 
theory of mind development.   
Prior to developing knowledge about others’ mental states, children are egocentric; they 
see events from their own point of view and have difficulty sharing others’ perspectives 
(Schreibman, 2005).  Piaget’s (1926) early studies found that children younger than 7- or 8-years 
old are unable to understand others’ internal mental states and, therefore, are unable to 
successfully modify messages to account for what a listener does or does not know.  Since 
Piaget’s early work, research on this topic has shown that children begin to develop theory-of-
mind abilities by at least 3 years of age, and master many skills by age five (Baron-Cohen, 
Lombardo, Tager-Flusberg, Cohen, 2013; Flavell, 2004; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).   
Theory-of-mind abilities improve as children interact with the world around them.  As 
Astington (2001) points out, children’s internal resources, along with social supports, influence 
theory-of-mind development.  Children increase their mental-state vocabulary and social-
cognitive skills through everyday interactions with peers and adults (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, 
Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991).  In particular, early joint attention skills (Charman et al., 2000; Van 
Hecke et al., 2007) and language skills (Schick, de Villiers, de Villiers, & Hoffmeister, 2007; 
Watson, Painter, & Bornstein, 2001) have been found to facilitate later theory-of-mind 
development.  A longitudinal study by Nelson, Adamson, and Bakeman (2008) found that 
toddlers (ages 18-30 months) who engaged in longer, richer, periods of joint engagement with 
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their caregivers had higher false belief scores by preschool (42-66 months). Richer periods of 
engagement included more time spent coordinating attention between a caregiver and an object, 
and/or more time spent incorporating symbols in the interaction.  
While joint attention skills are viewed as a precursor to theory-of-mind development, 
language skills have been discussed as both precursors and consequences of social 
understanding.  Language enables children to talk about others’ thoughts and desires, but it is 
also a means by which they learn mental states (Astington, 2001). Even before children acquire 
their own expressive language abilities, they are engaging in mental-state interactions with 
others.  For example, parents who ask their child to indicate a preference for one toy over 
another are engaging in interactions about wants and desires.  Despite having little to no 
language, young children are able to participate in this social interaction by picking up the object 
or gesturing towards it.  Children seem to master the semantics of mental-state terms around the 
same time they master false belief tasks (Moore, Pure, & Furrow, 1990).   
Lohmann & Tomasello (2003) outline four “global hypotheses” that describe how 
language and theory of mind might be interrelated.  The first hypothesis suggests that children 
come to understand false beliefs by learning mental-state terms.  Knowing common mental-state 
terms (e.g., think, know, and believe) influences children’s abilities to learn how mental states are 
discussed (Astington, 2000; Bartsch & Wellman, 1995).  Adults often use these terms to 
reference a mental state, and children who can connect the mental-state term to the relevant 
mental state (referent), develop an understanding about mental states.   
A second hypothesis, proposed by de Villiers and de Villiers (2000), suggests that syntax 
helps children reason about false beliefs.  Adults talking about false beliefs formulate sentences 
that include a full clause as the object complement (syntax complementation).  Lohmann & 
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Tomasello (2003) provide the following example: Peter thinks Mommy’s home.  This sentence 
can be broken down into a main clause with a mental state (Peter thinks X) and its embedded 
clause (that Mommy’s home).  Thus, understanding the underlying rules that govern sentence 
structure can help children understand underlying mental states. More recently, Slade and 
Ruffman (2005) found supporting evidence that general language abilities (e.g., syntax, 
semantics), rather than a particular aspect of language, correlate with theory of mind. 
The third hypothesis, supported by Harris (1996, 1999) and Tomasello (1999), suggests 
children begin to recognize others’ mental states through exchange and discourse.  This 
hypothesis does not rely on semantic content or syntax to explain how language influences false 
belief understanding.  In comparison to the first hypothesis, proponents of this idea suggest that 
children learn about mental sates when they are part of the conversation. Children come to know 
that other people may know things they do not know through “linguistic interchange” (Lohmann 
& Tomasello, 2003).  A training study by Guajardo & Watson (2002) manipulated children’s 
exposure to naturalistic discourse about mental states.  The results indicated that greater exposure 
to discourse (through training) improved children’s performance on theory-of-mind 
understanding.  
Finally, the fourth hypothesis claims that language does not play a special role, and 
instead, language is grouped together with other relevant data that contributes to children’s 
growing understanding of others’ minds (Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003).  No one in particular 
has made this claim; however, Gopnik & Wellman (1992) describe a similar explanation in their 
case for a theory-theory.  Theory theory (TT) postulates that children come to develop theories 
about the mind just as scientists develop theories, and that these theories can change with time. 
Thus, there is clear evidence that language plays a role in theory-of-mind development; 
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however, the nature of that role remains undefined. Furthermore, these studies have explored the 
relationship between language and social understanding primarily through the false belief task.  
We will highlight some of the challenges of using this task as the singular marker of theory-of-
mind understanding in the next section.  
1.2 Measuring Theory of Mind 
False-belief tasks have been the most commonly used measures to determine whether or 
not a child understands others’ mental states (de Villers & Pyers, 2002; Walker & Shore, 2011).  
Early work on this topic purports that children do not develop theory of mind until they are able 
to recognize that people’s mental states may be misinformed and misaligned with that of reality 
(i.e., false belief; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  Although false-belief tasks have been 
administered on numerous occasions, there have been some recent debates on the validity of 
using this single task to signify theory-of-mind development (Bloom & German, 2000; Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001).  
On the one hand, Povinelli and Preuss (1995) argue that false-belief tasks are an excellent 
test of theory of mind since a child who acquires false-belief understanding must appreciate the 
divergence between the mind and the world.  Davis (2001) also notes that successful 
performance on false-belief tasks demonstrates a shift from non-representational understanding 
to a general representational understanding of the mind.  False-belief tasks require a child to 
recognize that mental states are internal and may be distinct from reality (Wellman, Cross, & 
Watson, 2001).  
On the other hand, a primary argument against using false-belief tasks as the sole 
indicator of theory-of-mind development is that these tasks require skills that extend beyond 
theory-of-mind abilities.  Bloom and German (2000) note that the classic Sally-Anne task (see 
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Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) and the contents false-belief task (see Hogrefe, Wimmer, & 
Perner, 1986) are too difficult in and of themselves. For the Sally-Anne task, Bloom and German 
(2000) argue that the child must be able to follow a narrative, remember the characters’ actions, 
recall where the chocolate was stored at the start of the task and where it is at the end of it, 
understand that the question is asking where will Sally look not where should she look, and be 
able to inhibit the notion that beliefs are inherently true, in order to successfully pass the task.  
The contents false belief task presents children with a familiar object with unexpected contents.  
Correctly answering this task places similar cognitive demands on the child by requiring him or 
her to inhibit any previous knowledge about what will be inside.  
Some researchers have re-designed the approach to testing false-belief understanding by 
using spontaneous-response tasks.  Spontaneous-response tasks, such as violation-of-expectation 
(VOE) and anticipatory-looking (AL) tasks, allow researchers to infer children’s understanding 
from behaviors he or she produces while watching a scene unfold (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 
2010).  These tasks have been used with children under age two and unlike elicited-response 
tasks they do not require children to explicitly answer a question about others’ mental states. 
Scott and Baillargeon’s (2009) response account notes that elicited-response tasks require 
children to carry out three processes: 1) represent another’s false belief, 2) access their 
representation of another person’s false belief in order to answer a question, and 3) inhibit their 
own tendency to answer the question based on their own knowledge.  In contrast, the 
spontaneous-response tasks only require children to represent another’s mental state.  
Interestingly, results using spontaneous-response tasks suggest that children are able to attribute 
false-beliefs to others by the second year of life when tested using spontaneous-response tasks.  
9 
1.3 Wellman and Liu’s Theory-of-Mind Scale 
Despite abundant false-belief studies, many questions remain unanswered regarding the 
complex aspects of theory-of-mind development.  To address some of these issues, Wellman and 
Liu (2004) conducted a thorough meta-analysis of over 40 studies relating to children’s 
developing theory-of-mind abilities.  They began their review by identifying studies that tested 
different aspects of mental-state understanding (e.g., desires vs. beliefs, ignorance vs. false 
belief).  Next, they consolidated their findings into a series of seven experimental tasks that 
could represent the emergence of theory-of-mind in young children.   
Wellman and Liu (2004) administered seven tasks to 75 typically developing 3-, 4-, 5-
year-old children and found that children performed similarly on the two tasks that probed false 
beliefs (Contents False Belief and Explicit False Belief) and the two that probed hidden emotions 
(Belief Emotion task and Real-Apparent Emotions).  They had initially included these similar 
tasks to see whether different task formats (testing the same conceptual content) resulted in 
different performance. Since the results were similar, Wellman and Liu retained the Contents 
False Belief and Real-Apparent Emotions tasks in the final analysis. They established a five-item 
theory-of-mind scale based on the total proportion of children that passed each task, ranging 
from easiest to hardest.  The results yielded the following sequence for theory-of-mind 
development among preschoolers: Diverse Desires, Diverse Beliefs, Knowledge Access, False 
Belief, and Real-Apparent Emotions. 
The theory-of-mind scale includes five tasks showing the developmental progression of 
children’s understanding of others’ mental states.  As mentioned above, the tasks are ordered 
according to increasing difficulty for typically developing preschoolers.  The first and easiest 
task, Diverse Desires, requires the child to judge that two people may have different desires 
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about the same object.  The Diverse Beliefs task probes the child’s ability to judge that two 
people may have different beliefs about an unknown state of affairs without knowledge of which 
belief is true or false.  In the third task, Knowledge Access, the child is shown the contents of a 
box and is asked to judge the knowledge of another person who has not seen what the box 
contains. Not until the fourth task do we arrive at False Beliefs.  As mentioned earlier, in this 
task, the child is first shown the false contents of a distinctive container (e.g., Band-Aid box) and 
then asked to judge another person’s belief about what is inside the container.  Finally, the Real-
Apparent Emotions task, which was deemed most difficult, tests the child’s ability to judge that a 
person may internally feel one emotion, but overtly display a different one. 
The scale has also been adapted to understand how culture impacts theory-of-mind 
development (Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011; Wellman, Fang & Peterson, 
2011). Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, and Wellman (2011) found that 3- to 6-year-old Iranian 
children successfully passed Knowledge Access tasks prior to Diverse Beliefs.  Wellman, Fang, 
Liu, Zhu, and Liu (2006) found that Chinese-speaking preschoolers also passed Knowledge 
Access tasks prior to Diverse Beliefs. Comparatively, Australian and American children came to 
understand that people hold differing beliefs (Diverse Beliefs) before understanding that people 
can be knowledgeable or ignorant (Knowledge Access).  There was no evidence of cultural 
differences in the overall rates of theory-of-mind development among Iranian and Australian 
preschoolers; however, the authors suggest that future research should consider siblings 
(McAlister & Peterson, 2013), educational practices, parental attitudes, and parenting styles as 
variables that might influence the sequence of development.  Collectivist (Iranian and Chinese) 
and individualistic cultures (Australia and the United States) vary in terms of what each society 
values, and these findings raise interesting questions about other factors that might influence the 
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sequence of theory-of-mind development. 
1.4 Audition 
Current theory-of-mind literature ignores auditory input as an important source of 
information.  From a biological perspective, children experience auditory inputs prior to visual 
inputs.  The human cochlea reaches adult function soon after the fifth month of gestation (Elliot 
& Elliot, 1964), and it is around this time that a fetus begins hearing auditory signals (via fluid-
borne sounds; Northern & Downs, 1991).  There is also evidence that newborns pay acute 
attention to human voices, which could reflect an innate understanding that voices carry emotion 
and intent (Eisenberg, 1975).  
Audition also impacts other modes of perception, most commonly, vision.  Meredith and 
Stein (1987) conducted a study on multisensory neurons in cats’ superior colliculi.  The superior 
colliculus is a region in the brain responsible for integrating visual, auditory, and somatosensory 
inputs.  For instance, when the cat hears a sound, it “knows” to orient towards the sound because 
of perceptual processes occurring in real time.  This suggests that auditory events directly 
influence where the cat looks and what it sees, which in turn will impact what the cat comes to 
know (Smith & Katz, 1996).  
Buccino and colleagues (2001) suggest that humans understand actions and intentions by 
mapping the auditory/visual representation of an observed action onto our motor representation 
of the same action.  Similarly, once the actions of another individual are represented and 
understood in terms of one’s own actions, it is possible to predict the mental state of the other 
individual, leading to theory-of-mind abilities.  
Some recent studies have probed non-visual aspects of theory-of-mind development.  For 
example, Williamson, Brooks, and Meltzoff (2013) tested 2- and 3-year-olds to determine when 
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children come to understand others’ auditory perceptions.  The study presented children with 
four clear plastic tubes each filled with one of the following contents: glitter, beads, bells, or 
feathers.  When shaken, the tubes containing beads or bells produced a loud sound, while the 
tubes containing glitter or feathers produced a very soft sound.  Once children were familiarized 
with the objects, the experimenter briefly stepped out of the room to retrieve a baby doll sleeping 
in a bassinet.  Children were then instructed to either wake up the baby or allow her to continue 
sleeping by selecting the appropriate object in a paired-comparison test (e.g., glitter versus 
beads).  They found that children as young as 2 years old were able to choose the appropriate 
object (loud or soft) based on the goal of the task (wake versus don’t wake the baby).  This 
suggests that children have an early understanding of how sounds impact others’ perceptions and 
behaviors.  
Another study, by Moll, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2012), tested 2- and 3-year-old 
children on their understanding of another person’s auditory experience.  During the task, each 
child heard two sounds.  The first sound was played in the presence of an adult and the child, 
while the second sound was played only in the presence of the child.  When both sounds were 
later replayed, the adult reacted with surprise at hearing two sounds as opposed to one.  The 
results indicated that children as young as two years old were able to direct an adult’s attention to 
the second sound (not heard by the adult) more often than not.  These findings provide evidence 
that children demonstrate theory-of-mind abilities before 4 years of age and that they are able to 
extend their understanding beyond the visual realm. 
Brambring and Asbrock (2010) administered a series of altered false belief tasks to 
congenitally blind children between 4- and 10-years-old to determine whether reported delays in 
social understanding were linked to task demands.  They presented children with nine false belief 
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tasks that were primarily visual, primarily auditory, or primarily tactile.  The primarily auditory 
tasks included one unexpected outcomes task-previously learned (children were presented with 
the first part of a well-known children’s song, asked what they should hear next, and then 
presented with an unexpected continuation of another well-known song), one unexpected 
outcome-newly learned (children pressed a series of buttons following an auditory sequence, 
asked what they should hear next, and the presented with an unexpected sound that broke the 
sequence), and one change-of-locations task (children were presented with stories in which 
person A went away and person B changed locations, and were then asked to report where 
person A would look for person B).  Prior to Brambring and Asbrock’s (2010) study, research 
with this population suggested that blind children do not understand false beliefs till 8 years, 5 
months (approximately 4 years later than sighted children).  Their battery of false belief tasks led 
to evidence that false belief understanding emerges around 6 years, 8 months, and that 
congenitally blind children were able to reason about mental states in other modalities.  
Although there is some evidence that children can think about mental states in the 
auditory realm, there is also reason to think that they may perform differently on auditory tasks. 
Auditory and visual modalities have different characteristics.  For example, visual inputs allow 
children to follow postural and eye orientations, which may make it easier to understand others’ 
visual experiences, while auditory inputs do not provide any such observable behavioral markers.  
Vision is also considered to be a more active sense than audition because it is closely linked with 
action (Moll, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2012) and provides viewers with quick, reliable 
information about objects in their environment (i.e., “what” and “where”).  Auditory inputs, on 
the other hand, do not provide listeners with any information as to what is producing the sound 
or where it is coming from.  Children do not learn that an object’s acoustic properties are 
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uncovered by listening, not looking, until around 3 years old (Pillow, 1993).  Williamson, 
Brooks, & Meltzoff (2013) also note that, for humans, ears are not located as prominently as 
eyes are on the face (e.g., eyes are in the front, ears are on the side and often obscured by hair).  
Thus, they suggest that mental-state understanding via auditory information is comparatively 
harder for children (Moll, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2012).  
In sum, theory-of-mind development has been well documented, and researchers have 
found that, with age, children’s understanding improves from a simple awareness of beliefs and 
desires to a more complex understanding of others’ knowledge and ignorance, false beliefs, and 
hidden emotions.  Some preliminary evidence suggests that preschoolers have an early 
understanding of knowledge and ignorance based on audition; however, to date, there is little 
research available on how children develop an understanding of others’ experiences with sound.  
Our study extends the current theory-of-mind scale to include five parallel auditory tasks that 
assess children’s ability to reason about mental states in the auditory realm.  
1.5 The Present Study 
Our goals were to 1) assess whether or not preschool children are able to reason about 
mental-state representations in the auditory realm, 2) identify when children come to understand 
others’ mental-state representations of auditory experiences, and 3) determine whether this 
understanding in the auditory realm develops at the same time and in the same sequence as the 
visual theory-of-mind scale.  To test theory-of-mind abilities related to audition, we crafted five 
tasks that paralleled those in Wellman and Liu’s (2014) theory-of-mind scale but which focused 
on auditory input more so than visual or multimodal input.  The five new auditory tasks probe 
the same aspects of mental-state understanding -- desires, beliefs, knowledge and ignorance, 
false beliefs, and real versus apparent emotions-- assessed by Wellman and Liu’s (2004) theory-
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of-mind scale.  
We compared preschoolers’ (3-, 4-, and 5-year olds) performance on all five aspects of 
theory-of-mind development across two modalities (visual and auditory).  In line with previous 
research, we expected that children would pass more tasks with increasing age.  We did not 
expect any differences in performance between boys and girls.  For purposes of replication, we 
anticipated that performance on the visual tasks would be similar to what Wellman and Liu 
(2004) reported for their theory-of-mind scale.  We also predicted that children would perform 
similarly on the newly designed auditory tasks and the visual tasks; however, this prediction was 
based on the limited availability of studies focusing on audition.   
There are a few possibilities related to how children will perform on the auditory tasks. 
One possibility is that children will find the auditory tasks easier than the visual ones since their 
experience with auditory input begins in the womb.  Another possibility, as Moll, Carpenter and 
Tomasello (2012) point out, is that the auditory tasks will be more difficult than the visual tasks 
since auditory experiences do not provide any observable behavioral markers.  It is also possible, 
as we predict, that the auditory and visual tasks are equally challenging, regardless of modality.  
By the time children are in preschool, our capacity to integrate sensory inputs and view the world 
as a whole could eliminate any differences between performance on visual and on auditory tasks 
that probe the same underlying construct. 
In terms of the sequence of performance, we hypothesized that children would pass the 
auditory tasks in the same sequence as the visual tasks since the auditory tasks were comparable 
to other tasks utilized in published research.  Overall, we hypothesized that children would come 
to understand others’ mental states of auditory experiences in the same sequence as the theory-
of-mind scale: Diverse Desires, Diverse Beliefs, Knowledge Access, False Beliefs, and Real-
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Apparent Emotions.   
Furthermore, we predicted that the auditory tasks would be scalable.  We utilized 
Guttman scaling (Guttman, 1944) to confirm whether or not the auditory tasks formed a scalable 
set.  The Guttman scale represents strict and ideal response patterns based on increasing 
difficulty of the tasks.  Thus, if the tasks represent a scale, knowing a child’s Guttman score 
would reveal how they performed on all easier items in the scale.  If a child fits the Guttman 
scale, then passing a particular item along the scale would indicate that he or she successfully 
passed all easier items as well.  
2 METHOD 
2.1 Participants 
Sixty-six typically developing children (36 boys and 30 girls) participated in this study: 
22 3-year-olds (range = 35 months to 46 months;                ), 22 4-year-olds (range 
= 47 months to 59 months;         , SD = 3.9) and 22 5-year-olds (range = 60 months to 69 
months;                ).  Children were recruited from the Georgia State University 
Developmental Psychology child subject pool.  Families were identified via website and 
community postings, bulk mailings, recruitment from other research studies and word of mouth.  
Once a child met the criteria for age and typical development, parents were contacted by phone 
or email, provided a brief description of the project, and invited to participate.  The sample 
consisted of 74% European American, 20% African American, 2% Asian American, and 5% 
biracial children.  An additional three children participated in the study, but were excluded from 
the final sample due to experimenter error.  
17 
2.2 Design 
We used a 3 x 2 x 2 repeated measures design to test our hypotheses.  The between-
subjects factors were age (3-, 4-, or 5-years-olds) and gender.  The within-subjects factor was 
modality, defined as auditory or visual.  
Each child was randomly assigned to participate in one of four presentation orders.  The 
orders were generated based on the following constraints: 1) all orders began with a Diverse 
Desires task, 2) all orders ended with a Real-Apparent Emotions task, and 3) the auditory and 
visual tasks assessing a given aspect of theory of mind (e.g., Knowledge Access) were not 
presented directly one after another.  As per Wellman and Liu’s (2004) recommendation, we 
began each administration with Diverse Desires (auditory or visual) to ease the child into the 
tasks, and ended with a Real-Apparent Emotions task (auditory or visual), which was deemed the 
hardest task according to the theory-of-mind scale.  Thus, each child received a total of 10 tasks 
beginning with a Diverse Desires task, and ending with a Real-Apparent Emotions task.  The 
four presentation orders are shown in Table 1.  Of the 66 children, 18 received Order A, 15 
received Order B, 15 received Order C, and 18 received Order D.  
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Table 1. Order of Presentation for the Theory-of-Mind Tasks 
 
Order           
A DD-V RAE-V FB-A KA-A DB-V DD-A FB-V DB-A KA-V RAE-A 
B DD-V DB-V KA-V DD-A FB-V RAE-A KA-A FB-A DB-A RAE-V 
C DD-A FB-V RAE-V 
KA-V 
DB-A FB-A KA-A DB-V DD-V RAE-A 
D DD-A KA-V FB-A RAE-A DD-V DB-A FB-V KA-A DB-V RAE-V 
Note. The 10 tasks are abbreviated above as: Diverse Desires (DD), Diverse Beliefs (DB), Knowledge Access (KA), False Belief 
(FB), Real-Apparent Emotion (RAE).  Visual tasks are denoted by -V; auditory tasks are denoted by -A.
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2.3 Tasks  
We adopted five tasks from the theory-of-mind scale established by Wellman and Liu 
(2004) and constructed five tasks that aimed to explore comparable mental-state understanding in 
the auditory realm.  Table 2 contains a brief description of the five aspects of mental-state 
understanding that were assessed.  Visual tasks were those described in Wellman and Liu’s 
(2004) theory-of-mind scale; auditory tasks were designed to parallel the visual tasks, but they 
utilized sounds as the target stimuli.  Figure 1 provides a representation of the sounds and stimuli 
utilized in the 10 tasks.  Tasks were administered in a structured format, and the child was 
prompted to respond to two types of questions: target questions and contrast/control questions. 
Each task began by either introducing a protagonist in the form of a toy figurine (e.g., Polly) 
or an object with a hidden item inside (e.g., an opaque box containing pennies).  After the child 
was oriented to the situation, he or she was asked the control question(s) about reality/own 
mental state and the target question(s) about a protagonist’s mental state.  The child was allowed 
to respond verbally or indicate an answer by gesturing (most commonly with a point).  For a 
detailed description of each task see Appendix A. 
Both the auditory and visual versions of each task utilized the same toy figurine.  Pictures 
were clipart images evenly spaced and printed on 8.5 x 11 sheets of paper and included: 1) 
cookie and carrot, 2) bushes and a garage, and 3) an emotion scale with simple black and white 
happy, sad, and neutral faces.  The sounds included: 1) piano, 2) drums, 3) “ambiguous” sheep 
sound, 4) cat meowing, and 5) an emotion scale with sound clips of a child laughing, child 
crying, and child saying “hmm”.  The objects included: 1) two nondescript wooden boxes, 2) a 
toy dog, 3) pennies, 4) a Band-Aid box (clearly identifiable), 5) a toy pig, and 6) a small stuffed 
animal dog containing the audio clip of a cat meowing.  
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To preserve the parallels between the auditory and visual tasks, we presented children with 
structured scenarios using the same protagonist and similar stimuli.  The Diverse Desires task 
introduced the child to Mr. Jones.  For the visual task, the child was told it was snack time and 
Mr. Jones would like to choose a snack to eat; for the auditory task, he or she was told it was 
music time and Mr. Jones would like to choose an instrument to hear.  The child was prompted 
to indicate his or her preference for a snack (carrot or cookie) or an instrument (piano or drums).  
The experimenter then informed the child that it was a good choice, and proceeded to reveal Mr. 
Jones’ desire (opposite to the child’s desire).  The target question required the child to indicate 
which one snack/instrument Mr. Jones would choose.  A child who was able to inhibit his or her 
own desire and respond with Mr. Jones’ desire was scored as successfully passing the task. 
In the visual Diverse Beliefs task, the child was told that Linda wanted to find her cat, and 
that her cat might be hiding in the bushes or in the garage.  The child was then asked where he or 
she thought the cat was hiding.  After hearing the child’s response, the experimenter informed 
the child that it was a good idea, and revealed where Linda believed the cat was hiding (opposite 
to the child’s belief). The target question asked the child to indicate where Linda would look for 
her cat. For the auditory Diverse Beliefs task, the child was told that Linda wanted to identify a 
particular sound. The experimenter played the clip, told the child the sound might be a cow or a 
sheep, and prompted the child for his or her thoughts on whether they heard a cow or a sheep.  
After hearing the child’s response, the experimenter informed the child that it was a good idea 
and told the child what Linda believed she heard (opposite to the child’s belief). The target 
question asked the child to indicate what Linda believed she was hearing. 
The Knowledge Access tasks presented the child with nondescript boxes containing small 
hidden objects. Each child was initially asked what he or she thought was in the box. The child 
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could provide any answer or indicate that he or she did not know. For the visual task, the 
experimenter opened a box to reveal a small toy dog; for the auditory task, the experimenter 
rattled a sealed box filled with pennies. After the child correctly answered the control question of 
what was inside, the experimenter introduced Polly. The child was told that Polly had never 
seen/heard what was inside the box. The target questions then asked then child whether Polly 
knew what was in the box and if Polly had seen/heard what was inside.  
The False Belief task presented each child with what appeared to be a familiar object paired 
with a mismatched reality. In the visual task, the child was presented with a clearly identifiable 
Band-Aid box and asked what he or she thought was inside; similarly, for the auditory task, we 
presented the child with a toy dog and asked what sound the toy should make.  Once the child 
correctly identified the true character of what they should see/hear, the experimenter presented 
the mismatched reality. The Band-Aid box was opened to reveal a toy pig inside, while the toy 
dog actually produced a cat sound.  The child was then introduced to Peter who had never seen 
inside the box (visual) or heard the sound the toy produces (auditory).  The target questions 
asked the child what Peter thought was in the box/what sound Peter thought the toy should make 
(a dog sound or a cat sound), as well as whether or not Peter saw inside the box or heard the 
sound.  
The final task assessed hidden emotions and was presented in the form of a story. Prior to 
telling the story, each child was trained on an emotional scale using pictures (a sheet of paper 
with three faces drawn on it–happy, neutral/okay and sad) for the visual task and sound clips (a 
child laughing, child crying, and child saying “hmm”) for the auditory task to ensure knowledge 
of the emotional expressions.  The child was told to expect questions regarding how Matt really 
felt inside and how he looked on his face/sounded in his voice. The experimenter also told the 
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child how Matt really felt inside might be the same as how he looks on his face/sounds in his 
voice or it might be different. The visual task story was as follows: 
This story is about Matt. Matt’s aunt just got back from a trip. She promised that she 
would buy Matt a toy car, but, she got Matt a book instead. Matt doesn’t like books. 
What Matt really wants is a toy car, but Matt has to hide how he feels, because if his aunt 
knows his real feelings, she’ll never buy him anything again. 
Similarly, the auditory task was as follows: 
This story is about Matt. Matt’s aunt is on the phone. She promised that she would take 
Matt to visit the zoo today, but when she called she told Matt that she is taking him to the 
mall instead. Matt doesn’t like going to the mall. What Matt really wants to do is go to 
the zoo, but Matt has to hide how he feels, because if his aunt knows his real feelings, she 
would never take him anywhere again. 
After reading the story aloud, the experimenter proceeded to ask two control questions 
and two target questions. The control questions were administered to check for comprehension 
and asked what Matt’s aunt offered him and what she would do if she knew how Matt really felt. 
If the child answered these two questions correctly, the experimenter followed up with target 
questions about how Matt really felt inside—happy, sad, or okay, and how Matt tried to look on 
his face/sound in his voice—happy, sad, or okay. 
The experimenter scored each child’s response during the administration. Responses 
were scored using a binary system (pass/fail) for both the control and target questions. If the 
child passed the control and target questions he or she received a score of 1; however, if the child 
passed only one or neither of the question types, he or she received a score of 0. Any alternative 
answers were also scored as zeroes. For example, one child answered that the ambiguous sound 
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in the auditory Diverse Beliefs task was a horse, despite being provided with answer choices of 
cow and sheep. We calculated an overall composite score (out of 10) based on the child’s 
individual responses to each task. We also computed separate sub-scores for the total number of 
auditory (out of 5) and visual (out of 5) tasks passed. 
 
Table 2. Theory-of-Mind Tasks 
 
Task Premise (Children’s ability to…) 
Diverse Desires (DD) Understand that people might have different desires than their own, and this 
will guide their behavior 
Auditory: Piano versus drums sound clips 
 
Diverse Beliefs (DB) Understand that people might have different beliefs about the same object, 
and the child does not know which belief is true or false 
Auditory: Ambiguous sound (Is it a cow or sheep?) 
 
Knowledge Access 
(KA) 
Attribute knowledge and ignorance to a person 
Auditory: Sealed, opaque box filled with pennies 
 
False Belief (FB) Understand that two people can have different or conflicting beliefs about 
the same event 
Auditory: Toy dog producing a cat sound 
 
Real-Apparent 
Emotions (RAE) 
Understand that a person can feel one emotion internally but display a 
different emotion 
Auditory: Narrative plus auditory emotion scale- child laughing, crying, or 
neutral “hmm” 
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Figure 1. Images representing the stimuli used to test the five aspects of theory-of-mind 
development.  
 
Objects and text presented on the left of each protagonist are used in the visual tasks, while 
objects and text presented on the right are used in the auditory tasks. 
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2.4 Procedures 
Parents and children were invited to participate in one session in the Learning and 
Development Laboratory at Georgia State University.  Sessions were approximately one hour 
and involved several brief experiments in addition to the theory-of-mind tasks.  These 
experiments varied based on the child’s age, as well as the current studies being administered in 
the laboratory.  A quarter of the time (~15 minutes) was allocated for the theory-of-mind tasks, 
but there was no set order for when the 10 tasks were presented relative to other studies.  
Each child was tested individually in a quiet room and was seated at a small table across 
from the experimenter.  A parent was allowed to remain in the room throughout the 
administration; the parent was seated behind the child so as to minimize distractions.  The 
session was video-recorded from two mounted cameras providing separate angles for reviewing 
purposes.  One camera angle focused on the child and the stimuli being manipulated while the 
other provided a profile view of the experimenter, child, and stimuli.  Stimuli were kept out of 
sight until the child was introduced to a given task.   
Parents completed a general consent form and brief demographic questionnaire prior to 
testing.  We maintained confidentiality by assigning each participant an identification number 
and storing the video records in a locked cabinet housed in a locked room.   
2.5 Inter-observer Agreement 
The principal investigator, who was also responsible for administering the sessions, 
initially scored each child’s responses.  Inter-observer agreement was assessed for both 
modalities using Cohen’s kappa (Cohen, 1960), and agreement was defined as both coders 
awarding one point for successfully passing a task or zero points for failing a task.  To assess 
agreement, two observers independently coded the 5 visual and 5 auditory tasks for 15 (23%) 
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children. Sessions were randomly selected from the corpus with the constraint that each age 
group was represented equally.  
We tallied the frequency of agreements and disagreements using two, 2x2 contingency 
(kappa) tables for the visual and auditory tasks (see Bakeman & Quera, 2011).  Of the 75 
judgments per modality; 34 were pass and 38 were fail; in 3 cases, the second observer called a 
fail what the first observer called a pass, and in no cases did the second observer call a pass what 
the first observer called a fail.  Based on the subset of videos coded, kappas for performance on 
each task were .92 for the auditory and visual tasks, which yielded 95% agreement between the 
observers.  
3 RESULTS 
Each of the five aspects of theory-of-mind development was assessed using an auditory 
and visual task (see Figure 1). Children were tested on all 10 tasks and were given a total score 
of number of tasks correct ranging from 0 to 10.  On average, children passed approximately half 
of all tasks (                   ).  
3.1 Children’s Performance Across Modalities 
Our first goal was to develop a set of five auditory tasks that paralleled the tasks used to 
establish Wellman & Liu’s (2004) theory-of-mind scale.  These novel tasks would help us 
address our first research question of whether or not children are able to reason about mental-
state representations in the auditory realm. Since both sets of tasks assessed the same aspects of 
mental-state understanding, we anticipated that children would perform similarly on the auditory 
and visual theory-of-mind scale tasks. Our results indicated that children were able to pass a 
comparable number of auditory (                   ) and visual tasks (       
            ).  Table 3 shows the total number and percent of children who passed each 
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auditory and visual task, as well as results from Wellman and Liu’s (2004) study.  The findings 
revealed considerable differences in the proportion of children who passed the visual tasks in 
both samples, with fewer preschoolers from our sample passing each task compared to Wellman 
and Liu’s (2004) sample. 
To determine whether children’s performance was influenced by modality, age, or 
gender, we conducted a repeated measures analysis of variance with age and gender as the 
between-subjects factors and modality as the repeated measures factor. We expected to find a 
significant main effect of age, but no effect of gender or modality.  The results confirmed a 
significant main effect of age, along with a main effect of gender.  There was no significant 
effect of modality on performance, nor did we find any significant interactions among the 
variables.  
As expected, children passed significantly more tasks with increasing age, F (2, 60) = 
21.34, p < .001,    
 = .416 (See Table 4). We found that 5-year-olds performed significantly 
better than 3-year-olds (p < .001), and 4-year-olds performed significantly better than 3-year-olds 
(p < .001); however, there was no significant difference in performance between 4- and 5-year-
old children (Bonferroni’s post-hoc analyses). On average, 3-year-olds passed less than half of 
all tasks (                 ), 4-year-olds passed approximately half of the tasks (       
          ), and 5-year-olds passed more than half of all 10 tasks (                 ).  
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Table 3. Numbers (and Percentages) of Children who Passed the ToM Tasks 
 
 
Auditory Tasks 
N = 66 
Visual Tasks 
N = 66 
Wellman & Liu (2004) 
N = 75 
    
Diverse Desires 48 (72.7) 52 (78.8) 71 (95) 
Diverse Beliefs 52 (78.8) 54 (81.8) 63 (84) 
Knowledge Access 32 (48.5) 32 (48.5) 55 (73) 
False Belief-Contents 18 (27.3) 18 (27.3) 44 (59) 
Real-Apparent Emotion 8 (12.1) 8 (12.1) 24 (32) 
Note. The table shows the total number (and percentage) of children correct on each task, ordered from the easiest to the hardest, as 
per the theory-of-mind scale. Wellman and Liu’s (2004) results include data from 75, 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds 
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Table 4. Numbers (and Percentages) of Children who Passed the ToM Tasks by Age 
 
Note. n =22 per age group; (SD) represents Standard Deviation values  
 Visual Tasks Auditory Tasks 
 
3yo 4yo 5yo 3yo 4yo 5yo 
Diverse Desires 13 (59.1) 17 (77.3) 22 (100.0) 9 (40.9) 19 (86.4) 20 (90.9) 
Diverse Beliefs 14 (63.6) 19 (86.4) 21 (95.5) 13 (59.1) 19 (86.4) 20 (90.9) 
Knowledge Access 2 (9.1) 11 (50.0) 19 (86.4) 4 (18.2) 12 (54.5) 16 (72.7) 
False Belief-Contents 1 (4.5) 9 (40.9) 8 (36.4) 3 (13.6) 5 (22.7) 10 (45.5) 
Real-Apparent Emotion 0 (0.0) 4 (18.2) 4 (18.2) 1 (4.5) 2 (9.1) 5 (22.7) 
 
Mean # of tasks correct (SD) 
 
1.41 (.91) 
 
2.73 (1.24) 
 
3.36 (1.33) 
 
1.36 (.85) 
 
2.59 (1.05) 
 
3.23 (1.11) 
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Contrary to our predictions, we found a significant effect of gender on overall 
performance (F (1, 60) = 4.12, p < .047    
 = .064).  When we compared the total number of 
correct responses, girls (                 ) performed significantly better than boys 
(                 ), F (1, 44) = 6.46, p < .015,    
 = .128.  There was no significant 
interaction between gender and modality, but looking at the mean number of tasks children 
passed, we found that girls (                 ) performed significantly better than boys 
(                 ) on the visual tasks, t (64) = -2.10, p = .04; d = .53, but not on the 
auditory tasks, t (64) = -1.42, p = .16; d = .35.   
Given our focus on the effect of modality on children’s performance for theory-of-mind 
tasks, we inspected the patterns of performance on each task as a function of modality even 
though we did not find a main effect for modality.  As shown in Figure 2, there were no clear 
differences in performance related to modality on any individual task. The results displayed in 
Table 4 also show minimal to no differences in the number of children who passed each task 
across modalities.  For example, more 4-year-olds passed the visual False Beliefs task (40.9%) 
compared to the auditory False Belief task (22.7%); however, this was a difference of just four 
(out of 22) children.  All 3-year-old children failed to pass the visual Real-Apparent Emotions 
task, but only one passed the parallel auditory task.  Five-year-olds demonstrated a similar 
understanding across all tasks and both modalities.  Additionally, there was no effect of task 
order on children’s performance.   
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Figure 2. Total proportion of children correct by modality of task and age.  
 
The 10 tasks are abbreviated above as: Diverse Desires (DD), Diverse Beliefs (DB), Knowledge Access (KA), False Belief (FB), 
Real-Apparent Emotion (RAE).
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3.2 Scaling Theory-of-Mind Development 
Our second goal was two-fold: 1) we wanted to identify when children come to 
understand others’ mental-state representations of auditory experiences, and 2) we were 
interested in knowing whether theory-of-mind abilities develop at the same time and progress in 
the same sequence as Wellman & Liu’s (2004) theory-of-mind scale.  
To address the first part of our goal, we computed how many children passed the auditory 
tasks in each age group (see Table 4). We found that our youngest participants (3-year-olds) 
were able to reason about some mental states in the auditory realm particularly for the Diverse 
Desires and Diverse Beliefs tasks.  Four- and five-year-olds performed better than 3-year-olds on 
the auditory tasks, but there was greater variability in 4- and 5-year-olds ability to reason about 
False Belief and Real-Apparent Emotions.  
To address the second part of our goal, we identified which children fit the strict Guttman 
patterns of the theory-of-mind scale (Diverse Desires, Diverse Beliefs, Knowledge Access, False 
Belief, and Real-Apparent Emotions) for the visual and auditory tasks.  We hypothesized that 
children would pass the auditory tasks in the same sequence as the theory-of-mind scale since the 
auditory tasks were comparable to other tasks utilized in Wellman and Liu’s (2004) scale.  The 
patterns for the visual and auditory tasks were analyzed separately, and patterns ranged from 
passing none of the tasks (- - - - -), to passing one (+ - - - -), two (+ + - - -), three (+ + + - -), four 
(+ + + + -), or all five tasks (+ + + + +).  A child who did not fit any of the patterns demonstrated 
an alternative pattern where he or she passed a later task along the scale, but failed even one 
easier item.  Alternative patterns were categorized as “other”.   
Table 5 contains the six ideal Guttman response patterns for a five-item scale (top) and 
frequency counts related to children’s performance on the visual and auditory tasks (bottom).  As 
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shown in the table, 50 of the 66 (75.8%) children in our sample fit one of the six ideal 
theory-of-mind scale patterns for the visual tasks.  Of the 16 (24.2%) children who demonstrated 
an alternative pattern, 7 (10.6%) children showed only a reversal in understanding at the Diverse 
Desires and Diverse Beliefs stage.  Wellman and Liu (2004) reported that 60 of their 75 (80%) 
preschool participants fit the strict Guttman patterns, while 15 (20%) children were categorized 
as “other” (based on the results they reported, it was not possible to determine which alternate 
patterns occurred most often in their sample).  Children tended to pass more items in succession 
with increasing age; the relationship between age (in months) and Guttman scale score for the 
visual tasks was high, r (66) = .60, p < .01.  Wellman & Liu (2004) also reported a high 
correlation between age and scale scores, r (75) = .64, p < .001.   
Our analyses resulted in similar findings for the auditory tasks. We fit children’s 
responses to the Guttman patterns defined by Wellman & Liu’s (2004) theory-of-mind scale and 
found that 44 of the 66 (66.7%) children fit the scale (see Table 5).  Of the 22 (32.3%) children 
who fit an alternative pattern (passed a later task along the scale but failed even one easier item), 
6 (9.1%) children showed a reversal in understanding only at the Diverse Desires and Diverse 
Beliefs stage.  We also found a strong relationship between age (in months) and Guttman scale 
score for the auditory tasks (summing the items passed out of five), r (66) = .50, p < .01.
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Table 5. Patterns for the Visual and Auditory ToM Guttman Scales and Number of Children who Fit the Patterns  
 
 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 Other 
Diverse Desires - + + + + +  
Diverse Beliefs - - + + + +  
Knowledge Access - - - + + +  
False Belief-Contents - - - - + +  
Real-Apparent Emotion - - - - - +  
Visual 
       
3-year-olds 4 3 8 1 0 0 6 
4-year-olds 0 0 5 3 4 2 8 
5-year-olds 0 1 2 9 5 3 2 
Total 4 4 15 13 9 5 16 
Auditory 
       
3-year-olds 3 3 3 1 0 0 12 
4-year-olds 1 1 5 6 4 0 5 
5-year-olds 0 1 2 6 6 2 5 
Total 4 5 10 13 10 2 22 
Note. A minus sign indicates that the child failed the task; a plus sign indicates the child passed. Any child who did not exhibit one of 
the six patterns (P) presented above was categorized as “Other”.  N = 66, 22 in each age group. 
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We analyzed children’s performance at the individual-level to determine how many fit 
the scale in one modality but not another. Our results yielded: 13 of the 66 (19.7%) children fit 
the scale for the visual tasks but not auditory, 6 of the 66 (9.1%) children fit the scale for the 
auditory tasks but not visual, and 9 of the 66 (13.6%) children did not fit either the visual or 
auditory Guttman scales.  
We computed the coefficient of reproducibility (Rep) using Green’s method of estimation 
to determine if our results formed a scalable set.  The coefficient of reproducibility from the 
scalogram analysis was .95 for our visual tasks (after removing two children who did not pass 
any tasks) and .92 for our auditory tasks (after removing two children who did not pass any 
tasks). Values greater than .90 indicate scalable items, thus both auditory and visual tasks formed 
a scalable set. 
Green’s index of consistency (I) estimates the Rep that would be expected by chance if 
the tasks were mutually independent. Green’s index of consistency was .47 for the visual tasks 
and .29 for the auditory tasks (values greater than .50 are considered significant).  Thus, the 
scales did not form a scalable set when compared to chance; however Green (1956) notes that the 
index of consistency is more conservative than the coefficient of reproducibility.  Wellman & 
Liu (2004) report Green’s index of consistency for the visual tasks was .56. 
3.3 Task-Level Analyses  
Wellman and Liu (2004) also conducted a series of pairwise comparisons to determine 
whether particular tasks were easier than others. We conducted the same analyses for both 
auditory and visual tasks, particularly since we found some children passed Diverse Beliefs prior 
to Diverse Desires. Our results confirmed three significant pairwise comparisons across 
modalities. First, Diverse Beliefs was significantly easier than False Beliefs in both the auditory 
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(McNemar’s         25.93, p < .001) and visual (McNemar’s         32.24, p < .001) realms. 
Second, Knowledge Access was significantly easier than False Belief in both the auditory 
(McNemar’s         8.65, p < .003) and visual realms (McNemar’s         8.45, p < .004). 
Finally, the False Beliefs task was significantly easier than the Real-Apparent Emotions task in 
both the auditory (McNemar’s         5.04, p < .025) and visual (McNemar’s         5.06, p 
< .024) realms. However, the earliest two tasks did not appear in a sequence; Diverse Desires did 
not prove to be easier than Diverse Beliefs in either the auditory or visual modality, McNemar’s 
        .45, p = ns and         .01, p = ns, respectively.  
As shown in the Guttman scales, a child often reached a particular task that was too 
difficult and failed all subsequently harder tasks. We were interested in examining whether they 
were unable to pass the task because of poor comprehension of the control questions or because 
the entire task was too difficult.  The Diverse Desires and Diverse Beliefs tasks require the child 
to state his or her own desire/belief, and then identify the protagonist’s contrasting mental state. 
Thus, only three of the five aspects of theory-of-mind development were of interest because 
Diverse Desires and Diverse Beliefs did not have control questions that a child could fail.  
Of the children who did not pass the target questions for the Knowledge Access task, 22 
(65%) passed the control questions for the visual task and 25 (74%) passed the control questions 
for the auditory task. Even more children demonstrated comprehension for the visual and 
auditory False Belief control questions, 45 (94%) and 41 (85%), respectively.  The Real-
Apparent Emotions tasks required children to answer two control questions and two target 
questions (see Appendix A). Of the children who did not successfully pass this task, 6 (10%) 
children were able to answer both control questions for the visual task, and 7 (12%) children 
were able to answer both control questions on the auditory tasks.  Furthermore, 15 (26%) 
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additional children were able to correctly answer that Matt’s aunt bought him a book in the 
visual task, and 17 (29%) were able to correctly answer that Matt’s aunt said she would take him 
to the mall, but all of these children failed to answer the second control question of what Matt’s 
aunt would do if she knew how Matt really felt.  Children largely misunderstood this control 
question and prematurely answered with an emotion (happy, sad, or okay).   
Children who failed either the Knowledge Access or False Belief task because of the target 
question still demonstrated an understanding of the task and the concealed object/sound, but their 
ability to extend that knowledge to the protagonist was lacking.  Although few children passed 
the Real-Apparent Emotions task overall, a vast majority who failed did so because they could 
not answer how Matt’s emotions could impact his aunt’s behavior.  However, most children were 
able to answer the first control question related to what Matt’s aunt did (bought him a book; said 
she was taking him to the mall), but not what Matt’s aunt would do, in the future, if she knew 
how he really felt (she would never buy him anything ever again; she would never take him 
anywhere ever again). Thus, children were able to comprehend the Knowledge Access, False 
Belief, and part of the Real-Apparent Emotions tasks, and it is valuable to assess performance on 
these control questions because they provide more information about children’s emerging 
understanding.  
4 DISCUSSION 
The current study was the first to investigate preschoolers’ mental-state abilities in the 
auditory realm using a set of auditory tasks that paralleled Wellman and Liu’s (2004) theory-of-
mind scale.  In line with previous research (Calero, Salles, Semelman, & Sigman, 2013; 
Wellman & Liu, 2004), children’s capacity to understand various aspects of theory of mind (i.e., 
desires, beliefs, and emotions) increased with age, and we found evidence of this progression 
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using the auditory tasks as well. Children as young as 3 years old were able to reason about some 
aspects of others’ auditory representations of thoughts, behaviors, and emotions, and, in line with 
other studies of mental-state understanding (Davis, 2001; Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Moses, 
1990; Gelman & Au, 1996), they made significant strides in theory-of-mind development in the 
auditory realm during the preschool years.   
Overall, children passed a comparable number of tasks across visual and auditory 
modalities.  We also found that performance on three of the five aspects of theory-of-mind 
development (Diverse Desires, False Belief, and Real-Apparent Emotion) was equivalent across 
modalities. Given that modality did not significantly affect performance, we would expect that a 
child who was able to reason about others’ mental states for the visual properties of objects 
would also be able to reason about others’ mental states for its auditory properties. Auditory and 
visual tasks were matched to assess the same aspects of theory-of-mind development, thus 
equivalent performance across modalities shows mastery of the underlying construct. 
Our results indicated that girls had a higher total score correct than boys. Although, 
Wellman and Liu (2004) did not find a significant effect of gender on children’s performance, 
our findings are consistent with other studies in the literature.  For example, Charman, Ruffman, 
and Clements (2002) found that girls had a significant, but weak, advantage in their performance 
on false belief tasks.  Similarly, Nelson, Adamson, and Bakeman (2008) found preschool-aged 
girls passed significantly more false belief tasks than boys.  
Guttman scalogram analysis of the visual tasks revealed a slightly different pattern for our 
sample compared to Wellman & Liu’s (2004) sample. We administered the same visual tasks 
presented in the theory-of-mind scale; however, some children demonstrated a reversal in 
passing the Diverse Beliefs task prior to the Diverse Desires task. Thus, these children no longer 
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fit the scale, and were classified as fitting an alternative pattern.  Approximately one-fourth of 
participants did not fit the visual Guttman patterns.  
A majority of children passed the auditory tasks in the same sequence as the visual tasks; 
however, one in three children did not fit the auditory patterns. This was particularly evident 
amongst 3-year-olds. As mentioned before, there are several explanations for this reversal (i.e., 
genuine understanding of beliefs prior to desires, order of the tasks being presented, individual 
differences, cultural differences, etc.). Pairwise comparisons also confirmed that Diverse Desires 
was not significantly easier than Diverse Beliefs in either modality. Reversals in the sequence 
have also been found when comparing theory-of-mind abilities across cultures; however the 
reversal occurs between the stages of Diverse Beliefs and Knowledge Access (Shahaeian, 
Peterson, Slaughter, Wellman, 2011).  
Our findings are comparable in many regards to what Wellman & Liu (2004) report, but 
some differences did emerge.  Children in both samples showed a greater ability to reason about 
mental states with increasing age, and demonstrated theory-of-mind abilities prior to four years 
of age.  Considerably more children in Wellman & Liu’s sample passed each task, but this 
difference was most likely due to differences in sample characteristics.  Our 3-year-olds 
averaged 6 months younger than their sample of children.  There was no major difference in the 
mean age of 4-year-old participants; however, our mean age for 5-year-olds was 5 years, 3 
months compared to 5 years, 7 months for Wellman & Liu (2004).  It is also worth noting that 
our oldest participant was 5 years, 9 months, whereas they assessed children until the age of 6 
years, 6 months.   
Using Green’s coefficient of reproducibility (Rep) summary statistic we found that the 
visual tasks in both studies were highly scalable as were the newly crafted auditory tasks.  
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Wellman & Liu (2004) also computed Green’s index of consistency (I) to determine whether 
their visual tasks would be scalable if the tasks were treated as mutually independent and 
compared to chance.  Green (1956) notes that the chance reproducibility criterion of I = .50 gives 
“roughly comparable results” to other indices that have been used and that it was established for 
those who simply want to indicate a dichotomy of scales versus nonscales.  Wellman and Liu 
(2004) report I = .56; however, neither the visual (I = .47) nor auditory tasks (I = .26) in our 
study met criterion.  Our findings for the scalability of the visual tasks using Green’s index of 
consistency were largely the same as Wellman & Liu’s (2004) findings.  On the other hand, 
Green’s index of consistency yielded a nonscale for the auditory tasks.  It is possible that the 
greater number of deviations from the theory-of-mind scale (children categorized as “other”) for 
the auditory tasks impacted the index value.  Since theory-of-mind abilities are not mutually 
exclusive skills, the coefficient of reproducibility is a better measure than the index of 
consistency for determining whether the tasks represent a scalable set.  We therefore confirm that 
the visual tasks are a scalable set, and based on the Guttman scalogram analysis and Green’s 
coefficient of reproducibility, conclude that the auditory tasks also form a scalable set.  
The addition of these five new scalable auditory tasks enables researchers to probe the 
underlying constructs of theory-of-mind from another modality.  Sounds are private 
(Maclachlan, 1989), just like internal mental states.  Investigations using these auditory tasks 
could provide valuable information about the dual-role language plays in the development of 
mental-state understanding.  Language acquisition is also an auditory experience that begins 
early in life. There is evidence that children’s use of mental-state words at 2.5 years is correlated 
with their performance on false belief tasks at 4.5 years of age (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2015).  
Language abilities are just as crucial to developing mental-state understanding (Astington, 2001).  
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Thus, looking at the relationship between language development and auditory tasks could 
provide more information about how children come to understand others’ mental states.  This 
relationship may also help explain how gender influences performance on theory-of-mind tasks.  
For example, girls may acquire vocabulary for mental states earlier, if mothers spend more time 
talking about emotions with girls than boys (Dunn, Bretherton, & Munn, 1987). It is also 
possible that differences in performance among preschool boys and girls are related to greater 
amounts of time spent in symbol-infused joint engagement during toddlerhood (Nelson, 
Adamson, & Bakeman, 2008) and to higher verbal abilities for girls in preschool (Maccoby, 
1966).  The tasks demand children to follow linguistically complex stories, and differences in 
language skills, as well as differences in experience with talking about emotion, could translate 
to differences in performance.  Our study did not capture any data on children’s verbal or 
language abilities; however, future work should incorporate a language measure to determine 
how verbal skills may influence performance on auditory tasks.   
Moreover, the auditory tasks formed a scalable set according to the Guttman scalogram 
and Green’s coefficient of reproducibility, thus the tasks can be extended to other populations. It 
would be beneficial to administer these tasks on individuals who are visually impaired or have 
sensory difficulties (e.g., children with autism spectrum disorder). Research with both of these 
populations have shown delays or differences in sequence in theory-of-mind understanding, but 
perhaps assessing children using a variety of auditory tasks will reveal different patterns of 
mental-state understanding. 
Children with congenital blindness (without any additional impairments) have shown 
substantial delays, up to four years, in their ability to pass false belief tasks (Brambring & 
Asbrock, 2010; Peterson, Peterson, & Webb, 2000); It is possible that their responses were 
42 
 
limited by the format of the tasks and do not reflect their actual understanding of mental states. 
For example, blind children are limited in their ability to observe emotions through facial 
expressions and gestures (McAlpine & Moore, 1995). Thus, asking them to reason about 
someone’s real versus apparent emotions would be difficult since this is not the way they 
experience the world. Pérez-Pereira and Conti-Ramsden (2005) note that finding adequate and 
reliable tasks for blind children, that are equivalent to tasks for sighted children, is difficult.  
Perhaps probing their knowledge about mental states through auditory tasks could reveal an 
earlier understanding of others’ thoughts, beliefs, and emotions.  
Children with autism spectrum disorder consistently show a deficit in performance on 
implicit and explicit theory-of-mind tasks (Holroyd & Baron-Cohen, 1993; Peterson, Wellman, 
& Liu, 2005; Sodian, Schuwerk, & Kristen, 2015), and they demonstrate a substantial 
disadvantage when having to predict others’ behaviors (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith, 1985). 
Most longitudinal studies show a consistent deficit or delay in performance, but Steele, Joseph, 
and Tager-Flusberg (2003) administered 10 theory-of-mind tasks to children with autism 
spectrum disorder between the ages of 4 to 14 years (initial visit) and found significant 
improvements in performance one year later.  They suggest that using 10 tasks enabled them to 
assess a range of theory-of-mind abilities including desires, contents false belief, knowledge 
perception, lies and jokes, and moral judgments. Similarly, the auditory tasks developed for our 
study provide more and varied tasks that could potentially tap into a broader range of mental-
state understanding.  
The primary aim of this study was to expand the theory-of-mind scale to explore how the 
modality in which desires, beliefs, access to knowledge, and emotions are presented might 
influence theory-of-mind development in typically developing preschoolers.  Our largest 
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contribution is the addition of five new auditory tasks that parallel the theory-of-mind scale and 
prove to be scalable.  The findings add to the growing body of research that utilize multiple tasks 
to assess theory-of-mind (rather than relying on the false belief tasks alone) and to the literature 
demonstrating mental-state understanding prior to age four.   
As noted by Wellman & Liu (2004), the theory-of-mind scale confirms that mental-state 
abilities develop in a progression. The auditory tasks we utilized move beyond the confines of 
predominantly visual false-belief tasks and provide additional evidence that theory-of-mind 
development begins prior to four years of age.  In sum, our results support the idea that 
preschool-aged children demonstrate a developmental progression in their ability to reason about 
others’ mental state representations, and that they can do so across a variety of theory-of-mind 
tasks in the visual and auditory realms.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A. Theory-of-Mind Tasks Manual 
 
General Procedures:  The Theory-of-Mind Scale tasks always begin with a Diverse Desires 
task and end with a Real-Apparent Emotion task. The remaining eight tasks are randomized. All 
of the stories and prompts are located on a set of numbered cards. Be sure to present sounds and 
objects to the child in the order described on the story cards. Placement of the characters relative 
to the objects is key for certain tasks (e.g., Diverse Desires-Visual). 
 
Tasks: 10 (DD-V, DB-V, KA-V, FB-V, RAE-V, DD-A, DB-A, KA-A, FB-A, RAE-A) 
 
Props:  
 Story cards (Set of 10) 
 Characters (small figurines) 
o Mr. Jones 
o Linda 
o Polly 
o Peter 
o Matt 
 Objects 
o 8.5 x 11 laminated sheet of paper with a color drawing of a carrot on one half and 
cookie on the other  
o 8.5 x 11 laminated sheet of paper with a color drawing of bushes on one half and 
a garage on the other 
o Small nondescript rectangular container that can be opened/shut 
o Toy dog to fit in the small nondescript rectangular container 
o Small nondescript box with pennies inside (should be sealed shut) 
o Standard Band-Aid box with Band-Aid image on front 
o Toy pig to fit inside the Band-Aid box 
o Stuffed animal toy dog with small audio recorder inside 
o 8.5 x 11 laminated sheet of paper with emotion scale (three simple faces, bare-
bones smiley-type black and white faces of just circular outline plus simple eyes 
and line-like mouths). One happy, one sad, and one neutral (in the middle) 
 Sound clips:  
o Piano 
o Drums 
o Ambiguous animal sound 
o Cat meowing  
o Child laughing 
o Child crying 
o Child neutral (child says “hmm”) 
 
Set-up: Be sure that all sounds clips have been loaded onto the media player and the volume is 
set to 100%. Keep all props out-of-sight. 
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Administration guidelines and story cards:  The theory-of-mind scale tasks have a set of 10 
accompanying story cards.  Each story card contains information regarding the props, set-up, 
questions, and scoring guidelines necessary to administer the task.  Below are some guidelines to 
follow when administering each task: 
 
Task Total # of times to 
ask the question 
When faced with non-compliance, should you return to 
the task later? 
Diverse Desires 2x Yes, only once more 
Diverse Beliefs 2x Yes, only once more 
Knowledge Access 2x Yes, unless you have already opened/shaken the box 
False Belief Follow prompts 
on script 
Yes, unless you have already opened the box/played the 
sound 
Real-Apparent 
Emotion 
2x No 
 
The story cards are as follows:  
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Scoring:  Correct answers vary by task. See story cards to determine how to score each task. The 
child must correctly answer any control questions in addition to the target questions to pass the 
task. The experimenter should be sure to distinguish between an incorrect answer and no 
response.  Children can also use gestures to indicate their response.  A correct answer awards the 
child a score of 1, while an incorrect answer awards them 0 points.  Scores range from 0 to 10. 
 
General Notes:  In general, the experimenter should wait to administer a task until the child 
demonstrates some level of engagement (e.g., eye contact, paying attention to the props). It is 
important to maintain a neutral tone of voice throughout administration. The experimenter 
should be careful not to prompt any particular response to curb question bias.  For the auditory 
tasks, be sure the child does not hear the sound prior to presentation.  
